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AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (29 Sep 72) DAFD-OTT

16 Oct 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel Robert W. Springman,
Senior Advisor, Kien Tuong Province, Period 5 July 1971 -
20 August 1972

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
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ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (U.S. ARMY)
ATTN: "DAFD-OTT" WASH. D.C. 20310

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U.
2 July 1971).
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel Robert W. Springman,
subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not
be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or
of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a
result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of
covering letter.

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VERNE L. BOWERS
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, ADVISORY TEAM 85
KIEN TUONG PROVINCE
APO 96215

MACDA-85/SA

19 August 1972

SUBJECT: AFRIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS: MACCORDS 174-03) LTC ROBERT W. SPRINGMAN, 529-36-3819

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: MACCORDS, (AC of S, CORDS)
APO 96222

1. Attached is the Province Advisor's Completion of Tour Report completed for the period 5 July 1970 to 19 August 1972.

2. May I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for having had the opportunity to serve in this capacity. Having seen the chaos that existed in 1964-65 in the American community, I have a great appreciation for the CORDS organization. It is my understanding that CORDS as such will soon disappear. I only hope that the spirit of inter-agency cooperation that has been inherent in CORDS will remain, but fear it will die with the departure of those who have experienced it. In my opinion this is the time for further combining and merging of our personnel assets rather than going our separate ways again. I also feel that the CORDS concept should be expanded to other country teams outside Vietnam, and perhaps needs some sort of combined counterpart headquarters in Washington. It has been very rewarding to work with the outstanding officers from State and AID as well as the military officers assigned to CORDS during my tour. The DSA's on my team have been particularly outstanding and I would be remiss if I departed without again stating the continued requirement for more of these highly selected majors to be assigned to the Provinces in the future. The last DSA in Kien Tuong will depart in November 1972. If suitable replacements are not received the advisory effort there will be seriously crippled.

INCL

Robert W. Springman
ROBERT W. SPRINGMAN
LTC, AMOR
Province Senior Advisor

SECTION I

NAME: ROBERT W. SPRINGMAN

GRADE: LTC

SSAN: 529-36-3819

BRANCH OF SERVICE: ARMOR

PROVINCE: KIEN TUONG

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 5 JULY 1970 - 20 AUGUST 1972

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 20 AUGUST 1972

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATE - INCLUSIVE) SEPT 1964 - SEPT 1965

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S): DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISOR,
CHO LACH, VINH LONG

SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Eighteen years experience, college graduate, several Military schools; including CGSC.

2. What training did you have for this position?

Nine months operations and language training at FSI.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

If massive air support is to be the U.S. response to enemy offensives, Air-Ground instruction would insure that those advisors left on the ground could apply it properly.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

Eighteen months with the option to extend for six additional months.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

The support my team received greatly improved recently with the organization of the DASE. This may be due to the initiative and attitude of Col. Brandon Parker rather than the organization.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

Generally program success was proportionate to the support provided, with Phung Hoang being the exception. That program received extensive support but results were very marginal.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 2-69 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Generally, yes. In those cases a PSA feels he has something significant to report which is not required there is nothing to prevent a separate letter report being submitted.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 2-69 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

No, but I know of no better way to do it given the vast differences between the Provinces.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Some conflicting requirements naturally occurred due to the number of headquarters interested in some aspect of operations in the Province. Coordinating and pointing out the conflict usually solved the problem.

ANSWER QUESTIONS 10 - 15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

1. EDC
2. Public Safety
3. LIT

11. The most effective para military forces are:

1. PSU
2. APT
3. PSDP

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

1. RF/PP
2. Public Health
3. Education (though much is still needed)

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. RF/PP
2. LIT
3. Education

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

1. Social Welfare programs
2. VSD
3. National Police

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:

1. Hydraulic service
2. PTT - Communications services
3. VSD

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. In most cases VIS does a fair job of making the information available.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

The government has carried out most of its promises to their satisfaction while the enemy has been rather indiscriminant in his use of firepower, causing most of the people to support the GVN against them.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? YES.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart?

No. The plan arrived late and earlier guidance was received piecemeal from the various ministries which made coordination virtually impossible at this level.

SECTION III
FUNCTIONAL AREAS

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF: Territorial Forces in this Province have performed very well, having experienced only one OB overrun in two years. At least 10 more RF companies will be required, however, if the territory is to be controlled. 80% of the Province is unpopulated and the recruiting base will not support the additional forces, so out of Province recruiting will be necessary.

PSDF: The PSDF has been recently purged by MSS and local officials to ensure we are not arming the enemy to the extent we did when the numerical goal was the overriding factor. During the recent offensive we experienced several instances of real heroism and a generally good performance by combat PSDF. The support PSDF is unfortunately still a "paper" organization.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

National Police Field Force: Given the restrictions on employment of NPFF - "only in secure areas" - These people have rationalized themselves into almost complete inactivity. Greater latitude should be given in this area.

National Police Operations: Generally unsatisfactory. The Police are the most corrupt organization we have with a few exceptions. These people are generally draft dodgers with little or no commitment to their duty. Much extensive screening and purging of the ranks is needed before this organization will begin to be productive.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

Village Self Development: Should be dropped. Villages are capable of self sufficiency and should finance their own programs. Training of leaders and development of leaders is needed, not funds.

RD Cadre: Still a useful organization and should be retained at present level if possible. There is still a lot of area to be populated in Kien Tuong and Villages to be forced.

Ethnic Minorities: Not significant in Kien Tuong.

Local Government: The current training programs are a step in the right direction. If training could be offered to all candidates before elections, it might avoid the lag that follows election of new officials.

Aid in Kind: Not extensively used prior to the recent offensive, but essential in relatively large amounts to cover unforeseen problems.

REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee: We have had very few refugee problems in the past, and even now most of our people are staying on their land.

Social Welfare: This service has been the worst in this Province. War victims simply don't receive the response needed. The cadre in the Province Social Welfare office couldn't be more effective in countering this program if they were taking their orders from Ho Chi Minh. Maybe some are but none have been caught. Higher Headquarters seems to show the same attitudes, and in general burgle their program.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi: The Moc Hoa center should be closed because of high operating costs and a low number of Hoi Chanh. The program is a good one, but few are now rallying in Kien Tuong. Much more intelligence is being gained from the few ralliers we receive than in past years, however.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements: Although still burdensome, recurring reports are being cut. There seems to be too many one time reports containing information available from the GVN at higher headquarters.

Report Feedback: Most of the feedback is so out of date as to be useless to us. Having gained the information ourselves in order to report it, printouts, etc. are of little use to us. Analyses and comments extracted are useful, however, since they give us an idea of how we stack up in comparison to other provinces.

PHOENIX DIRECTORATE

PHOENIX: Phung Hoang has been the single most frustrating program we have. In concentrating on procedures, we seem to have lost sight of the real objective. The high level VCI remain virtually untouched, and the short sentence given to low level VCI is only a slight inconvenience to them. The recent P-6 campaign has had some real impact, however. The interrogation and processing of those held now needs great improvement.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health: Kien Tuong Province has an excellent Medical Chief who runs a good program and a good hospital. Some of the programs, such as the sanitary hailet program, have limited value in this area.

Education: Always plagued by the lack of well trained teachers, the program is nevertheless showing good progress.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Cont)

Public Works. Kien Tuong's Public Works service needs to be built up considerably. The few people they have get a lot done with their limited equipment. Being low priority because of low population has made the Province even worse in comparison to others.

Economic Development: The tractor is opening up areas in the plain of reeds that previously were thought to be worthless. Roads to markets are badly needed in order to spur further development.

Land Reform: Not too important at this stage of the game because of the vast areas available to anyone who wants to use the land. Nobody is going to get excited about owning three hectares when he can farm fifteen or twenty with no competition in sight.

Domestic Production: Not significant in Kien Tuong although some reed mats are woven locally.

Labor: Kien Tuong is short labor due to the small population. Organization is virtually non-existent.

Youth Affairs: I recommend this program be combined with the support PSDF. The service chief has a good program going in Moc Hoa now, but has difficulty getting things started in the countryside.

Public Administration: Bugged down by bureaucracy red tape and multiple command lines, administration is still poor. Some improvement has occurred, but this is a very weak area.

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